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Abstract
With the aim of developing existing theories of labour immigration policy, I
focus on the question of persisting demand for foreign workers during
economic downturns and how governments attempt to respond to this. The
argument is that, apart from turning a blind eye to irregular labour migration,
there are two ways in which governments respond to demand for migrant
labour during economic hard times. First, despite a rhetorical emphasis on
restricting labour immigration, they continue to facilitate the entry of highly
skilled labour migrants and the employment of migrants who enter a country
with a non-economic motive. Second, they encourage resident workers to
take up jobs in occupations where migrant workers are concentrated. This
hypothesis is borne out in my exploration of French and British government
responses to foreign labour demand between 2008 and 2013.
Keywords: labour immigration, labour supply, policy, Britain, France, economic
downturn
１ Introduction
The focus of the existing literature on immigration policy differs depending
on whether the context is good or bad economic times. In the good times,
scholars analyse government facilitation of labour immigration and the
role of stakeholders, such as employers and trade unions, in the policy
process (Krings, 2009; Menz, 2005). In the bad times, the emphasis is over-
whelmingly on government attempts to control and restrict immigration,
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particularly labour immigration (Cornelius et al., 1994; Guiraudon and
Joppke 2001). The dominant image presented in the latter analyses is of a
gap or disjuncture between public opinion and immigration policies and
above all between policy and levels of immigration (Freeman 1995;
Hollifield 2004; Joppke, 1998). The argument is that the preference among
the public at large, and at times also of governments, for low levels of
immigration is often not reflected in immigration policy or in actual levels
of immigration due to economic and political liberal constraints on gov-
ernment action. For example, Freeman has posited that organised inter-
ests, for example employer organisations, are better able to influence pol-
icy than the public and generally push for liberal labour immigration po-
licies (1995). Similarly, the gap between labour immigration policy and
levels of immigration can be explained by the fact that employers, arguably
especially during economic downturns, have a large appetite for relatively
cheap and compliant migrant labour. Consequently, even if labour immi-
gration policies are restrictive, the strong demand for and supply of foreign
labour results in irregular labour immigration. Furthermore, some scholars
emphasise that governments are cognisant of the economic benefits of
irregular migration and consequently tolerate it (Castles, 2004).
This article focuses more closely on the question of persisting demand
for foreign workers during economic downturns and how governments
attempt to respond to this. The argument is that, apart from turning a
blind eye to irregular labour migration, there are two ways in which gov-
ernments respond to migrant labour demand during economic slumps.
First, they continue to facilitate the entry and employment of certain cate-
gories of migrants who are considered to be important labour market
actors and whose entry they deem will be the least likely to upset public
opinion – and consequently their chances of re-election. I refer in particu-
lar to facilitating the entry of highly skilled labour immigrants, with skills
ostensibly not available on the domestic market and whose education is
perceived to facilitate their integration into society (Ruhs and Martin,
2008). But I also refer to the continuing provision of labour market access
to “indirect labour migrants,” those who enter a country with a non-eco-
nomic motive, for example family reunification or study. As the govern-
ment does not permit the latter to enter in order to work, it is, I argue, less
likely to be blamed for irresponsibly facilitating labour immigration in the
context of an economic slump. Second, they try to substitute migrant
workers１ with resident unemployed workers, by encouraging and obliging
the latter to engage in training and take up employment in occupations in
which migrant workers are significantly employed. It should be noted that
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the opposing pressures of employer demand for foreign workers and public
opposition to immigration are relatively constant fixtures in the minds of
immigration policy makers. However, the subjective pressure felt by pol-
icymakers to restrict labour immigration is much stronger during periods
of economic downturn and rising unemployment, as can be seen by
changes in government policy on immigration across advanced democra-
cies during these periods (OECD, 2009).
Important theorising on immigration policy in Europe in the context of
inclement economic conditions was done between the 1970s and 1990s.
However, the politico-economic climate has changed considerably since
the late 1990s. Governments now work firmly within a paradigm of global
economic integration. Human capital competitiveness has become a key
policy aim in most European states and the facilitation of highly skilled
migrant workers has been viewed, since the late 1990s, as a requirement of
open competitive economies (Devitt, 2010). In this sense, a complete clo-
sure to labour immigration, as occurred in the early 1970s in much of North
West Europe, is, I contend, highly unlikely today. Analyses of government
reactions to the current economic crisis, in terms of immigration, have so
far been largely produced by international organisations such as the OECD
and IOM. The focus of these analyses has been on changes to immigration
policy rather than on the question of labour supply during economic crises.
This paper thus aims to fill gaps in the literature in two main ways; it
approaches immigration policy in economic hard times in a novel way by
focusing on the question of government responses to on-going labour de-
mand; and it focuses on the current international economic crisis, which
has occurred in a markedly different politico-economic context than that
of the 1970s.
In particular, I explore how governments in two large European states,
Britain and France, have attempted to respond to foreign labour demand
between 2008 and 2013, based on analysis of official documents and inter-
views with policymakers and stakeholders in each state (see appendix).
The paper begins with a brief description of labour immigration policy in
the two countries in the period prior to the international financial crisis,
between the late 1990s and 2007, in order to assist readers in gauging the
level of policy change in the following period. Then, the paper compares
government policy across three dimensions: highly skilled labour immigra-
tion; indirect labour immigration; and substituting migrant workers with
resident workers. I then provide an explanation for differences in policy
choice in the two states and finish with some concluding remarks on how
this analysis contributes to immigration policy theory.
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２ Labour immigration policies late １９９０s-２００７
In the late 1990s, the discourse on labour immigration began to change in
Western Europe in the context of concerns regarding demographic decline
and labour shortages. British Labour governments decisively broke with
previous discourse, emphasising the contribution that economic migration
can make to the economy. The new policy approach which developed was
based around the concept of “managed migration” (Home Office, 2002).
Managed migration involves strong controls on unauthorised and non-
economic migration, in particular asylum-seeking, and the facilitation of
economic migration.
Between 2000 and 2004, the work permit system was eased and new
schemes were introduced for high and low skilled workers. The number of
work permits and first permissions issued between 1995 and 2005 more
than tripled (Somerville, 2007). New Labour also decided not to impose
restrictions on the free movement of workers from the new EU member
states on their accession on the 1st of May 2004. The strategy was to fill low
skilled labour needs with workers from the new member states and restrict
non-EU migration to the highly skilled. The numbers were far greater than
expected and public opinion polls generally showed an increasingly nega-
tive stance on immigration, with a majority preferring a reduction in in-
flows (Boswell, 2009).
In response to growing public concerns about immigration, Labour’s
third term saw a major consultation on how to manage economic migra-
tion, the outcome of which was the Points Based System (PBS), which was
rolled out from 2008. It consolidated existing work and study routes into
five main categories or “tiers”. Prospective immigrants gain entry if they
reach the required threshold of points, which are based on various criteria,
depending on the particular route through which they are applying. For
example, in the new Tier 2 general, prospective immigrants gain points for
a “graduate” job offer with a licensed “sponsor” (employer), prospective
earnings, English language ability and maintenance funds. Furthermore,
an independent advisory body on immigration policy was created in June
2007: the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC).
Since the late 1990s, the French debate on labour immigration has been
fed by concerns over the integration of resident migrant workers and des-
cendants of immigrants, as well as the objective of ensuring economic
competitiveness in a globalised world. The cross-party aim of gearing la-
bour immigration towards the highly skilled – and, particularly among the
centre right, reducing levels of family reunification – has become progres-
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sively stabilised. The basic consensus on labour immigration has been
hidden behind highly charged political conflict on other aspects of the
immigration regime, for example, rights to family reunification and the
treatment of irregular migrants. Immigration had become a major political
issue in the early 1980s with the growth of the Front National (FN) anti-
immigration party (Bertossi 2008).
The first elements of a selective immigration policy were introduced in
1998 by the centre-left government of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, includ-
ing a special immigration status for scientists and scholars (Weil, 2006).
Stimulated by concerns about economic competitiveness, the policy of
facilitating economic immigration was further developed by Minister of
the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, in the following centre-right government.
Sarkozy maintained that at that time legal immigration consisted only of
immigration subie, family and asylum inflows, which France was forced to
accept, as opposed to immigration choisie, which was one selected to
respond to the economy’s needs and integration capacity (Lochak, 2006).
The 24th July 2006 Immigration and Integration Law (loi relative à l’immi-
gration et à l’intégration) aimed to facilitate the access to the labour market
of skilled foreign workers and students. For example, the law introduced
shortage occupation lists and a “Skills and Talents” permit for highly skilled
people. On election to the French presidency in May 2007, Sarkozy ordered
the Minister for the Interior to aim to make economic immigration 50% of
total migrant inflows.
Between 2006 and 2008, economic migration to France rose from a total
of 11,678 to 21,352. This growth was, however, unlikely to have been the result
of the 2006 law. The decree establishing the shortage occupation list for non-
EU workers was only published in 2007 and all of the new permits and
categories represent small numbers. Four years after its introduction, only
317 foreign nationals were issued with Skills and Talents permits in 2010.
３ British and French labour supply policies ２００８-２０１３
The international financial crisis of 2008 led to the re-introduction of re-
strictions on labour immigration in most European states. As noted above,
attempts to place stronger controls on labour immigration pre-dated this
crisis in Britain and can be seen as a reaction to the size of migratory
inflows following the Eastern enlargement of 2004. However, attempts to
reduce levels of labour immigration came following the crisis in both
states. At the same time, in order to ensure that employers could continue
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to access skills, highly skilled labour immigration was protected. Further-
more, both states continued to allow the labour market participation of
family migrants, though student labour market participation was con-
strained in Britain. Finally, the policy of attempting to substitute immi-
grant labour with resident labour was more developed in the British case.
３.１ Highly skilled labour immigration
British immigration policy shifted sharply from expansive to restrictive
between 2009 and 2010. However, while governments have attempted to
reduce numbers of non-EU labour immigrants by, for example, raising the
skill threshold and imposing a numerical cap on certain inflows, significant
numbers of highly skilled immigrants were excluded from the new restric-
tions. Indeed, we can see a disjuncture between rhetoric and policy remi-
niscent of that identified in scholarship on government responses to irre-
gular labour immigration (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001). Despite strong
political commitments to reducing immigration, there is clearly a simulta-
neous economic interest, in this case voiced by multi-national companies
and other actors, in keeping the door ajar.
In France, the volte-face on labour immigration occurred later than in
Britain, two years later in fact. This was partly because the French economy
began to feel the heat of the crisis later than in Britain (in 2009). However,
levels of labour immigration, already low compared to Britain, did not fall
sharply in France. Thus it appears that despite the crisis, government offi-
cials saw fit to continue to permit skilled migrants to enter the country.
３.１.１ Britain
With the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, the approach to labour
immigration in Britain changed definitively. In that year, the House of
Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs published a report on the
“Economic Impact of Immigration”, which questioned the positive consen-
sus regarding the benefits of immigration. It maintained that there was a
risk that too much migration would reduce incentives for training, and was
contributing to the increase in housing prices, among other problems
(Devitt, 2010). The Labour government began to make qualitative adjust-
ments to the PBS in order to reduce inflows, for example strengthening the
Resident Labour Market Test (RLMT)２ in 2009 by lengthening the required
advertising period to four weeks.
Mirroring Thatcher’s Conservative party victory in the 1979 elections
(Schain, 2006), the Conservative party gained votes in the 2010 general
450 VOL. 2, NO. 4, 2014
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
election due to its tough line on immigration. As Prime Minister David
Cameron stated in March 2013:
As I’ve long argued, under the previous government immigration was far too
high and the system was badly out of control. Net migration needs to come
down radically from hundreds of thousands a year, to just tens of thousands,
and as we bring net migration down so we must also make sure that Britain
continues to benefit from it (Cameron, 2013).
Since in government, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition have
made some qualitative changes to the largest Tier of the PBS, Tier 2 (for
highly skilled migrant workers with a job offer in the UK), in order to
reduce the number of applicants; raising the job skill, language and the
minimum pay thresholds. Furthermore, the list of occupations on the
shortage occupation list was also shortened in September 2011.
Most controversially, in line with the Conservative electoral commit-
ment to reduce net migration to the “tens of thousands, not hundreds of
thousands”, the government introduced an annual cap on some categories
of non-EEA３ economic migrants. Since April 2011, the annual cap for Tier 2
has been set at 20,700. The government also decided to limit Tier 1, the
entry-channel which does not require a job offer in the UK prior to entry, to
investors, entrepreneurs, and people of “exceptional talent” (for whom
there are a maximum of 1,000 permits).
There has, however, been a general acceptance of the Conservative
restrictions on immigration among the main parties and stakeholders,
who display little appetite to oppose the general thrust of policy. While
the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties did not support the idea of a cap
on labour inflows, qualitative restrictions appear to be less controversial.
Only a few employer associations, which are affected by the restrictions, in
particular the ethnic catering industry, have been vociferously critical of
current policy (Interview BIS1, BHA). The trade unions have also tempered
their pro-migrant perspective and have begun to put more emphasis on
the need to upskill local workers (Interviews HO, TUC).
This, I argue, can be partly explained by the fact that the changes intro-
duced by the Conservatives are far less dramatic than might appear from
the party rhetoric. Indeed, Intra-Company Transfers (ICTs) – workers mov-
ing within multi-national companies (MNCs) – are not subject to the cap,
despite the MAC recommendation to the contrary, due to the MNC em-
ployer lobby and diplomatic pressure from the Indian and Japanese gov-
ernments (Interview MAC). This is significant as the ICT route is the most
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used route of the PBS system (about 70% of Tier 2 applications) and it is
the only one, which does not necessitate an assessment of whether there
are suitable candidates in the resident labour force (MAC 2009). The Tier 2
limit also does not apply to other categories including those who apply
from within the UK (in-country applicants) or to those who will earn over
£150,000 per annum. Furthermore, the cap on Tier 1 and Tier 2 routes
introduced in April 2011 was substantially undersubscribed. This is partly
accounted for by the fact that the cap was set at a relatively high level;
indeed, the number of permits available under Tier 2 for 2011-12 was greater
than the number of certificates issued under Tier 2 (excluding ICTs) in
2009 (Migration Observatory, 2011).
Moreover, while the Labour government made the RLMT more oner-
ous in 2009, there is no public certification of the process or pre-admis-
sion checks and post-admission checks on employers are infrequent. In
2009, the MAC asserted that there may be a case for introducing certifica-
tion; however, governments have not done so due to the cost it would
entail and a political antipathy towards red tape and regulation (Inter-
view MAC).
Figure 1 Work-related migration to the UK 1991-2011
Source: Migration Observatory Oxford 2014
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Indeed, the number of people entering the UK with a definite job fell from
145,000 in 2008 to 115,000 in 2011 (see Figure 1), demonstrating a persisting
demand for migrant workers in Britain despite the crisis.４
３.１.２ France
The international financial crisis did not have an immediate effect on im-
migration policy in France. Indeed, France was the first EU member state
to transpose the European Directive 2009/50/EC of the 25th of May 2009 on
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the pur-
poses of highly qualified employment with the law of the 16th of June 2011.
Furthermore, the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII)
“Labour Immigration” website was created in April 2010 in order to make
the French labour immigration procedures more accessible to employers
and prospective migrants.
However, the approach of the government to labour immigration chan-
ged markedly from 2011. Referring to the economic crisis and rise in un-
employment from 7.7% at the end of 2007 to nearly 10%, in late May 2011,
Claude Géant, Minister for the Interior, declared that total immigration
inflows were to be reduced by 20,000 and labour immigration by 50%. He
maintained that “contrary to myth, France does not need skilled foreign
workers. Last year, 730 foreign masons entered the territory; yet when Pôle
Emploi (public employment agency) advertises 20 mason jobs, 100 jobsee-
kers in France apply” (Le nouvel observateur 2013). A decree of the 31st of
May 2011 from the Ministers of Interior and Labour aimed to reduce the
numbers of permits issued (d. l. o.-m. Ministère de l’Intérieur, des collecti-
vités territoriales et de l’immigration et Ministère du travail, de l’emploi et de
la santé, 2011). The prefects were instructed to be particularly restrictive
regarding those with job offers, which were not particularly skilled, as
well as students applying for a temporary residence card in order to search
for a job or changing status from student to labour migrant. Furthermore,
the shortage occupation list for non-EEA nationals was also reduced from
30 occupations, defined on a regional basis, to 14 occupations for the entire
country, by means of a decree from the Interior Ministry (11th of August
2011).
However, the numbers of first work permits issued to non-EU nationals
did not fall sharply between 2010 and 2012. They decreased just slightly
from 18,759 in 2010 to an estimated 17,354 in 2012 (see Table 1) (Ministère
de l’Intérieur 2013).
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Table 1 First work-related residence permits issued to non-EU nationals 2006-2012
(in thousands)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
12,126 12,154 21,792 20,607 18,759 18, 303 17, 354
(estimate)
Source: Ministère de l’Intérieur 2013 p. 23
This suggests that the hardening of the RLMT criteria did not have a huge
effect on inflows. It may be explained by the fact that there were political
rather than economic motives behind the new restrictions imposed on
labour immigration and officials were consequently perhaps not under
pressure to implement the more restrictive policy in practice. Indeed, the
rhetoric was undoubtedly an attempt to siphon some of Marine Le Pen’s
electorate; opinion polls showed Marine Le Pen (FN) as a serious conten-
der for the 2012 Presidential elections, with a few polls even suggesting that
she could win the first round of the election (The Economist, 2012).
This return of a restrictive approach to labour immigration – at least on
a rhetorical and policy level – has been tempered during the Presidency of
Francois Hollande. On the 6th of May 2012, the Socialist candidate
Hollande won the presidential elections runoff with a vote of 51.63% to
Sarkozy’s 48.37%. A parliamentary debate on immigration took place in
April 2013 based on a Ministry of the Interior report on economic and
student immigration (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2013). This report notes the
low level of highly skilled migration to France, queries whether the RLMT
might be made less onerous and discusses the benefits of student immigra-
tion; suggesting that the Socialist government has an expansive approach
to economic immigration. An immigration bill to be published in 2014 will
introduce pluri-annual permits and is also expected to ease the RLMT
(Interview OLI2).
３.２ Indirect labour immigration
Indirect labour immigration, in particular family and student migrants’
access to the labour market has been more protected in France than in
Britain during the current economic downturn. While the British coalition
government examined the question of whether family migrants should be
permitted to access the British labour market in the context of the eco-
nomic downturn, French governments have not – at least transparently –
questioned family migrants’ participation in the labour market. Further-
more, the Sarkozy government’s attempt to restrict student access to the
labour market was unsuccessful, unlike that of the British government.
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３.２.１ France
Family migration is the object of contradictory policy signals in France. On
the one hand, centre-right governments have been intent on reducing
levels of family migration, on the basis that it is not beneficial to the French
economy or society, and on the other, it is recognised by most stakeholders
that family migrants represent an important source of labour for French
firms. Indeed, regarding the latter, non-labour migrant entries into the
labour market more than doubled since 1998, representing over fifty per
cent of new active foreigners in 2003 (Bertossi, 2008).
There have been numerous attempts to stem family migration over the
past decade, for example a 2007 law introduced a minimum level of French
language to be tested when the candidate applies for a visa to France, as
well as the demonstration that s/he endorses the main French constitu-
tional principles. Sarkozy recognised that family migrants were often em-
ployed in the French labour market, however, he argued that the problem
was that they were mainly low-skilled and were thus adding to the low-
skilled labour force.
Notably, however, while repeated attempts have been made by centre-
right governments to reduce levels of family immigration, the idea of re-
stricting family migrants’ access to the labour market has not been exam-
ined by government, as it has been in the UK. Indeed, the importance of
non-economic migrants in terms of labour market activity in France was
noted by the Centre for Strategic Analysis in the Prime Minister’s office in
2006, when it maintained that “we cannot restrict the concept of economic
immigration to ‘direct entries’” (CAS, 2006 p. 65).
French legislation and decrees have facilitated non-EU students’ access
to the labour market since the 1990s. Student immigration has represented
the second largest inflow to France after family immigration since 2006:
nearly a third of inflows in 2010. Between 2009 and 2010, the growth rate
was particularly high (+12%).
Bertossi maintains that the policy of training foreign elites in order to
exert influence on their countries of origin, dominant in the 1990s, has
shifted to a new policy, which aims to retain foreign students in order to
ensure the competitiveness of the French economy (2008). The law of 2006
established that students can work during their studies with an annual
limit of 964 hours (60% of a full-time job, compared to 50% previously).
Also, students graduating from a French university with a Masters degree
can reside in France for six months in order to search for a job. The number
of authorisations to work issued to students increased significantly since
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the late 1990s, in tandem with the general rise in numbers of foreign stu-
dents (from 11,000 to 40,000 between 1998 and 2003).
As discussed above, a decree of the 31st of May 2011 from the Ministers
of Interior and Labour instructed prefects to be particularly restrictive to-
wards students applying for jobs on graduation. However, due to protests
from students and universities (the “Collectif du 31 mai” movement), a new
decree of the 12th of January eased these restrictions, making reference to
the need to ensure the attractiveness of the higher education system and
competitiveness of French firms (d. l. o.-m. Ministère de l’Intérieur, des
collectivités territoriales et de l’immigration, Ministère du travail, de l’em-
ploi et de la santé et Ministère de l’Enseignment Supérieur et de la
Recherche 2012). On entering government, the Socialist government an-
nulled the decree. The strength of the opposition to this decree is due to
the fact that the majority of people issued with work permits in France are
already resident in France with student visas. Indeed, the Hollande govern-
ment is keen to increase the levels of student migration to France as it is
seen as a source of skilled workers (Interview Medef).
３.２.２ Britain
In Britain, labour immigrants’ dependants can participate in the labour
market provided that the PBS immigrant has been granted more than 12
months’ permission to stay in the UK. Allowing the employment of PBS
migrants’ spouses/partners provides employers with additional labour and
reduces demand for an opening of Tier 3 of the PBS for temporary low-
skilled workers (which has remained closed since the establishment of the
PBS). In the second quarter of 2008, 27.3 per cent of the total immigrant
stock had entered the UK in the previous five years to join a family or
spouse; a larger percentage than those entering for work or study or any
other reason. Over half of spouses/ partners were employed (59%) and 81
per cent of spouses/partners were employed in unskilled occupations
(MAC, 2009).
In the context of rising concern regarding unemployment and displace-
ment of resident workers with migrant workers, the MAC was asked to
assess the economic contribution made by the dependants of PBS migrants
and their role in the labour market in February 2009. In its report in August
of that year, the MAC maintained that there was no reason to conclude
that greater restrictions on working rights for dependants would lead to
improved outcomes, either for UK workers or for the UK economy (MAC,
2009).
Student migration has constituted the largest category of migration to
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the UK during the current economic downturn. However, a smaller propor-
tion of students participate in the labour market than family migrants.
According to LFS data５, only about 1 in 4 foreign-born students (both EU
and non-EU nationals) have paid employment (UKBA, 2010).
Concerns over foreign students using the student migration system as
an entry-way into the labour market prompted the Labour government to
restrict the work rights of students on courses below degree level and raise
the minimum level of English language study permitted under Tier 4 (the
PBS channel for students). However, the 2009 LFS suggests that there is
significant working in breach. For those studying below degree level, 53 per
cent reported working more than 21 hours per week (UKBA 2010).
In March 2011, following a public consultation on the student immigra-
tion system, the Government announced that the Tier 1 Post-study Work
visa category would close from April 2012. The Post-study Work visa en-
abled foreign students to remain in the UK for up to two years after obtain-
ing a UK degree. Since April 2012 international graduates are only able to
remain in the UK by switching into Tier 2 of the points-based system or if
they have a strong business proposition (under new provisions for student
entrepreneurs).
３.３ Substituting labour immigrants with resident workers
The two labour immigration systems aim to ensure that foreign workers
are only allowed to enter to take up a job when no suitable resident work-
ers are available for the job. However, over the past five years, British
governments have arguably placed more emphasis – at least at the discur-
sive level – on finding alternatives for migrant workers than French gov-
ernments have. The British MAC has an articulated system for investigat-
ing whether employers in different sectors are attempting to find alterna-
tives to bringing in foreign workers and governments have introduced
training programmes and schemes which aim to enable/induce resident
workers to take up jobs in sectors which employ significant numbers of
migrant workers.
３.３.１ Britain
Faced with growing complaints about the impact of Eastern European
migration on domestic workers, in June 2007, Prime Minister Gordon
Brown (Labour) famously called for “British workers for British jobs” in a
speech to the GMB Union (Summers, 2009). While the Conservative leader
David Cameron accused Brown of pandering to protectionist fears in 2007-
9, the Conservatives in government have emphasised the need to ensure
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that resident workers can compete with migrants, with a particular focus
on the British low-skilled. In July 2011, referring to new data that more than
half of new jobs in the past year had been taken by foreigners, the Work
and Pensions Secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, asserted that the welfare-to-
work schemes would fail if immigration were not more strictly controlled.
Duncan Smith urged employers to give British workers a “fair chance” and
not to automatically revert to foreign workers (Sparrow, 2011).
The main substitute for labour immigration discussed in the UK is the
training and “upskilling” of the resident labour force in order to provide
employers with the skills they need and reduce demand for foreign skills.
Other alternatives, in particular raising wages and improving working con-
ditions, are less emphasised in the public debate. The focus on skills can be
explained by growing concern about human capital competitiveness in the
UK over the past thirty years. The relative unattractiveness of the alterna-
tive of improving employment conditions is due to the fear that doing so
would reduce profits, employment growth and competitiveness; an unap-
pealing prospect for the economic liberals who dominate the UK political
arena.
Since the late 1990s, within the broad consensus on the need to improve
human capital competitiveness lay a growing focus on competing for the
“best and brightest” migrant workers. However, as numbers of migrant
workers grew over the past decade, concern about a reduction in opportu-
nities for the resident labour force led to a political emphasis on producing
the skills needed by employers within the UK rather than importing them.
This emphasis developed as the approach to immigration shifted from
positive to negative from around 2007-8 (Devitt, 2010). The restrictions
imposed on recruiting non-EEA foreign workers from 2010 have given
further impulse to efforts to produce skills domestically.
The MAC was charged with ascertaining when it was “sensible” to open
up to migrant workers by the Labour government in late 2007. In produ-
cing the shortage occupation list the MAC approach to the concept of
“sensible” is to consider each occupation with reference to whether em-
ployers have explored feasible alternatives to employing immigrants such
as training resident workers, raising wages and working conditions or
changing production processes. It is underlined that not all options are
feasible at all times and that the economic and regulatory environment
can make certain responses to labour shortages difficult; for example pub-
lic budgets can limit wage increases. However, despite this in-depth labour
market analysis, the “sensible” test is of limited weight; only a handful of
occupations are kept off the list if they have already been deemed skilled
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and in shortage (Interview MAC). This points, once again, to a disjuncture
between discourse – in this case on finding alternatives to labour immigra-
tion – and policy outputs in Britain.
In the context of a deepening economic recession, the rise of the ex-
treme right British National Party and upcoming national elections, in late
2008, Gordon Brown announced that when an occupation was put on the
shortage occupation list, the government would review whether and how
more training of resident workers could reduce the need for migrants
(Martin and Ruhs, 2010). However, by November 2009 coordination be-
tween immigration and education and training policy had still not oc-
curred, as evidenced in the Skills for growth: the National skills strategy
report; “Critically, we need to join up their (the MAC’s) work with the
remit we are giving the UK Commission to turn intelligence about
shortages into national training priorities in the skills system.” (BIS 2009,
p.11).
Indeed, according to an official from the Department for Business, In-
novation and Skills, it was not until 2010 that a coordinated policy on
immigration and skills development was formalised and that this was in
large part a reaction to the limits to be imposed on immigration and a
concern with ensuring that employers would be able to source skills in a
context of a more restrictive immigration policy; “The skills strategy 2010
was the first time we set out formally what we would do; because of the
introduction of the cap and the need for some kind of response in that
space” (Interview BIS1). Indeed, new qualifications had been designed for
ethnic catering at the end of Labour’s period in office in order to attempt to
fill chef skill shortages – which accounted for a large proportion of inflows
through the shortage occupation route – with resident workers. However,
this policy was further strengthened when all but the most highly qualified
chefs were taken off the shortage list in 2011.
The Coalition government has also put a lot of rhetorical emphasis on
labour competition from Eastern Europe and part of the policy response to
this is to stimulate the resident unemployed to take up available jobs, thus
reducing intra-EU mobility. The Department for Work and Pensions
(DWP) is trying to engage employers to recruit “UK workers” and disabuse
the latter of misconceptions they might have about certain sectors (Inter-
view DWP2). Indeed, the impending closure of the Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Scheme on the 31st of December 2013 led the DWP to introduce a
pilot scheme focusing on training unemployed UK people and persuading
them to take up agricultural work (Interview DWP2). However, this policy
of substituting migrant workers is still relatively small-scale and levels of
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intra-departmental coordination on this issue are limited (Interview BIS2).
Furthermore, employers have questioned the feasibility of the policy, ar-
guing that unlike migrant workers, British school leavers do not have the
required skills and are less reliable (Interview HO).
３.３.２ France
Direct labour migration to France is, as we have seen above, comparatively
limited. As such, until very recently, there has been very little debate on
how to reduce it. Indeed, the policy of reducing demand for migrant work-
ers by means of upgrading and revalorising jobs refuted by domestic work-
ers or providing domestic workers with the skills required by employers
has been dormant in France since the failed attempt made by Lionel Sto-
léru, Secretary of State for manual labour and immigration, in the 1970s
(Interview De Wenden).
The debate between the late 1990s and 2013 has rather been on how
much and what type of labour immigration should be facilitated in France
in order to respond to labour shortages, in the context of relatively high
levels of unemployment. However, while direct labour immigration is re-
latively insignificant in France, it doubled between 2006 and 2008 and the
centre-right government began to emphasise domestic alternatives to mi-
grant workers in 2011 in the context of the current economic downturn.
According to the decree of the 31st of May published by the Ministries of
Interior and Labour, “The priority has to be given to the employment of
jobseekers, of French or foreign nationality, already resident in France.”
This was seen as particularly important given the recent estimate of 23%
unemployment among non-European nationals resident in France. Among
other controls, the prefects were instructed to examine whether it would
be possible to quickly train jobseekers resident in France in an occupation
for which an employer has requested a work permit for a foreign worker (d.
l. o.-m. Ministère de l’Intérieur, des collectivités territoriales et de l’immi-
gration et Ministère du travail, de l’emploi et de la santé, 2011). Further-
more, the constitution of the shortage occupation list for non-EU workers
in 2011 took into account not just the relationship between job offers and
job seekers in particular occupations but also whether workers could be
trained in France in particular occupations. This had been less emphasised
in 2008 (Interview OLI1).
There is, nonetheless, a shared understanding among stakeholders that
migrant workers cannot be replaced by resident workers. Representatives
of two French trade unions, CGT and CFDT maintain that the idea of
substituting immigrants with resident unemployed is not taken seriously
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in France as the jobs migrants do are mainly low-paid and unattractive to
the resident unemployed (CGT2, CFDT2). Furthermore a representative
from the employers’ federation Medef asserted that the high levels of social
protection in France reduce incentives to return to work (Medef).
４ Explaining policy choices
A recent Financial Times article entitled “Britain “open for business and
closed to foreigners”“ exemplifies the strength of the Conservative party’s
anti-immigration rhetoric (Stephens, 2013). Strong anti-immigrant dis-
course, along with the imposition of a cap on immigration for the first
time, among other restrictive measures, certainly give the impression that
Britain has returned to a heavily restrictive immigration regime. However,
the reality is of course much more nuanced. Indeed, the comparison of
British and French responses to foreign labour demand over the past five
years leads me to conclude that both states have protected migrant inflows
during the current economic crisis due to on-going (though varying) de-
mand for migrant workers in both states. This is particularly the case of
official labour migrants in Britain, especially ICTs, and both official and
indirect labour migrants, in particular students, in France. This has not
stopped British governments from also attempting – albeit on a small-
scale – to substitute migrant workers with resident workers by means of
training and persuading people to take up jobs in sectors where migrant
workers concentrate. This search for alternatives to migration has been less
emphasised in France.
In explaining these policy choices, I emphasise converging and diver-
ging dominant economic and social perspectives. Due to the hegemony of
liberalism and the attendant global economic integration, human capital
competitiveness has come to be viewed as the lynchpin of economic
growth in developed economies, which can no longer compete on the
basis of cost (Crouch, 2005). As noted above, highly skilled migrant work-
ers are viewed to be important actors in this global skills competition and
most developed economies have been facilitating their entry since the late
1990s, including Britain and France. This perspective is partly fuelled by
employer groups, in particular those representing multi-nationals, which
lobby for access to skilled mobile workers. It is thus not surprising that,
despite restrictive immigration policy rhetoric and attempts to reduce in-
flows of labour immigrants, the highly skilled migrant categories have been
protected in both states. This is best exemplified by the fact that ICTs are
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exempt from the numerical cap placed on Tier 2 migrants in 2011, despite
the fact that they are the largest group of labour migrants in Britain and are
already exempt from the RLMT. Equally exemplary is the fact that the
Sarkozy government was unsuccessful in its attempt to restrict non-EU
students from being issued with work permits on graduation due to a
strong reaction from stakeholders.
There is, however, an important difference between Britain and France
in terms of labour immigration; Britain receives far higher numbers every
year, approximately 100,000 more than France. This can be partly ex-
plained by a more buoyant, flexible labour market and a more globally
integrated economy; Britain is the second largest destination for foreign
direct investment after the US. Indeed, Britain will continue to be more
open to immigration than France due to light touch labour market regula-
tion and a stronger policy focus on courting global financial investment.
The requirements of a globally integrated economy (i.e. highly skilled
migrant workers) are at odds with the politics of immigration, which have
become progressively contentious in both states. Since the 1980s and emer-
gence of the FN in France, immigration has become highly politicised and
due to continuing high levels of unemployment, any significant opening to
labour immigration has long been off the agenda. This makes “invisible”
indirect labour immigration comparatively important in France. The popu-
list force of the FN also explains the return to restrictive labour immigra-
tion policy rhetoric in 2011, while the tension between politics and the
economy accounts for the fact that, despite policy change, actual inflows
of labour immigrants did not decline. Despite the decade of a positive
consensus on labour immigration in Britain between the late 1990s and
2007, immigration has once again become something for everybody to
point their finger at. In order to attract disgruntled voters in the general
election of 2010, the Conservative party pledged to reduce net migration to
the tens of thousands. Indeed, politics explains the disjuncture between
rhetoric and policy outputs in the British case, as the main focus of the
government has been to reduce long-term migration, which contributes to
net migration, and consequently temporary migration – for example ICTs
coming to the Britain for less than 12 months – has not been restricted to
the same degree.
Finally, British attempts to reduce inflows of labour immigrants by
training domestic workers in skills perceived to be in shortage is explained
elsewhere as having been stimulated by a perceived over-reliance on la-
bour immigration, concerns about the socio-economic impact of labour
immigration and more a generalised preoccupation with raising skill levels
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in the country (Devitt, 2010). More recent efforts to persuade the resident
unemployed to take up jobs in occupations where there are significant
proportions of migrant workers is coherent with the development of active
labour market policy in Britain since the 1980s. British social protection has
become increasingly conditional on efforts to get back to work with the
aim of reducing public expenditure and taxation, increasing the labour
supply and keeping wages low (Bonoli, 2008; King, 1995). The recent at-
tempts to direct welfare recipients to “migrant jobs” is the other half of the
policy of reducing labour immigration by means of immigration controls
(Cameron, 2013). A similar attempt to “re-nationalise” migrant jobs
occurred in France in the 1970s, however, it is generally deemed to have
been a failure. This policy has not been re-activated during the current
crisis due to a generalised understanding that the resident unemployed
would not accept to do the low paid jobs migrants do. This can be under-
stood within the French tradition of social protection, which is more gen-
erous than that of Britain and traditionally more passive, putting less em-
phasis on stimulating/obliging a return to the labour market (Clasen and
Clegg, 2003).
The stronger focus on substituting migrant workers with domestic
workers in Britain is also partly explained by differing levels of labour
immigration in the two states. As noted above, Britain has received far
higher numbers of immigrants and EU citizens from Central and Eastern
Europe over recent years, which has been accompanied by to a rise in anti-
immigration sentiment in the country (Boswell, 2008). Indeed, public opi-
nion shows significantly higher levels of closure to immigration in Britain
than in France, as exemplified by the 2011 Transatlantic Trends: immigra-
tion survey６ (Transatlantic Trends, 2012). British governments conse-
quently have stronger incentives to at least appear to be reducing labour
immigration than French governments have.
５ Conclusion
A basic premise for this article is that we can expect governments to con-
cern themselves with attempting to ensure that employers – both public
and private – have access to supplies of labour. Putting labour supply at the
centre of this discussion of labour immigration policy in the context of
economic downturns enabled me to bring important, hitherto unexplored
aspects of labour immigration and welfare policy into the picture. Existing
studies of immigration policy during bad times tend to focus on the devel-
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opment of restrictive policies and on the outcomes of those policies. An
important finding of previous research is that oftentimes restrictive immi-
gration policy leads to a growth in irregular migration due to on-going
employer demand for cheap, compliant labour. This paper supports the
basic contention of persisting labour demand during economic downturns
and focuses squarely on the role of the state in responding to that demand.
It hypothesises and finds evidence for three further policy responses to
continuing demand for foreign workers during economic crises; protecting
highly skilled labour immigration; facilitating family and student migrants’
access to the labour market; and attempts to substitute migrant workers
with resident workers.
On this basis, I argue that labour immigration policy theory needs to be
updated to take into account how since the late 1990s governments in
advanced economies work firmly within a paradigm of global economic
integration. Within this interpretive framework, the facilitation of the
immigration of highly skilled workers is viewed as a requirement of open
competitive economies. As such, we can expect governments to protect
highly skilled worker immigration even during economic downturns.
Furthermore, labour immigration policy theory needs to expand its per-
spective to take into account the significance of indirect labour immigra-
tion – apart from irregular immigration – in particular, the facilitation of
family and student migrant participation in the economy. Finally, theory
needs to encompass government attempts to reduce demand for labour
immigrants by encouraging resident workers to take up jobs in occupa-
tions or sectors with high concentrations of foreign workers; that is immi-
gration control via active labour market policy.
This paper has also uncovered some of the factors, which currently
generate the liberal constraint on restrictive immigration policies identi-
fied by scholars such as Freeman (1995), Hollifield, (2004) and Joppke,
(1998). As regards skilled labour immigration in Britain, employer and
diplomatic lobbying in the context of governmental prioritisation of
human capital competitiveness ensured that these inflows would be pro-
tected. In France, it appears that the political rhetoric around reducing
labour immigration was mainly a ploy to siphon votes from the competing
FN party and was not reflective of real political will to reduce the already
small numbers of foreign workers entering the country each year. Non-EU
students’ access to the French labour market was protected by protests
from universities and students, with a direct interest in retaining this in-
centive to study in France. Finally, the policy of substituting migrant work-
ers with domestic workers has been constrained in France by a stakeholder
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consensus that the policy is not feasible given differing employment ex-
pectations of migrants and domestic workers. The policy is still marginal in
the UK and its growth has been constrained by similar doubts regarding
the viability of the policy as well as by departmental coordination limita-
tions.
Notes
1 . Migrant workers refer to foreign nationals based abroad who come to a country in order
to work.
2. Employers have to show that the role could not be filled from within the resident
labour market.
3. The European Economic Area (EEA) provides for the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital through three of four member states of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) and 27 of 28 member states of the European Union (EU), with Croatia
provisionally applying the agreement pending its ratification by all EEA countries.
4. It is, however, important to note that a significant proportion of non-EU work-related
inflows to Britain is composed of people coming to take up low-medium skilled work via
the Tier 5 Youth Mobility Scheme and non-PBS work visas for domestic workers in private
households, amongst other categories. Scott Blinder, ‘Non-European Labour Migration to
the Uk’, (Oxford: Migration Observatory Oxford, 2013). This differs from the French case,
where the majority of non-EU work-related flows consist of medium and highly skilled
individuals. Ministère De L’intérieur, ‘Les Données De L’immigration Professionnelle Et
Étudiante Document Préparatoire Au Débat Au Parlement’, (Paris, 2013).
5. It is important to note, however, that LFS data probably undercount students, espe-
cially those living in dormitories and other communal dwellings.
6. According to the Transatlantic Trends survey, in 2011, 33% of respondents in France and
57% of respondents in the UK perceived that there were too many immigrants in their
countries.
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